Africa Is Winning at the UN, but the Real Test Comes After the Vote

In March, Ghana achieved something that would have appeared politically improbable only a few years ago. A Ghana-led resolution at the United Nations General Assembly secured 123 votes to recognise the trafficking of enslaved Africans and racialised chattel enslavement as among the gravest crimes against humanity. The resolution also called for dialogue on reparatory justice, including formal apologies, the return of stolen artefacts, compensation and guarantees that such abuses will not be repeated.

Only three countries voted against it. Fifty-two abstained, including several European states. The resolution was not legally binding, but the vote still represented the strongest position the General Assembly has taken on the enslavement of Africans and its continuing consequences.

Then, in September, Togo led another striking African initiative. The General Assembly overwhelmingly backed a resolution calling for fairer global cartographic representation and encouraging the use of maps that show Africa at its proper scale. The measure passed with 164 votes in favour, one against and six abstentions.

Taken separately, the two decisions may look like symbolic victories. Viewed alongside Africa's recent campaigns on international taxation and the financing of African Union peace operations, however, they reveal a more consequential form of power: the ability to decide which neglected questions the international system must finally confront.

A pattern, not an isolated moment

The clearest example is international taxation. For decades, the rules governing cross-border taxation were shaped mainly through institutions in which developing countries had limited influence. In 2022, Nigeria, acting for the African Group at the UN, successfully advanced General Assembly Resolution 77/244. It moved the question of inclusive international tax cooperation firmly into the United Nations, where every member state has a seat.

The campaign did not stop after that first vote. Resolution 78/230 in 2023 established an intergovernmental process to develop the terms of reference for a UN framework convention on international tax cooperation. Resolution 79/235 in 2024 approved those terms and opened the way for formal negotiations. Those negotiations are now running from 2025 to 2027.

This matters because the intended destination is not another political declaration. It is a treaty framework. The final text is still being negotiated and may be weakened before completion, but Africa has already changed where the global tax debate takes place and who is entitled to shape it.

There has been movement in peace and security as well. In December 2023, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2719 after sustained African pressure and work by the Council's three elected African members at the time: Ghana, Gabon and Mozambique. The resolution established a framework under which UN assessed contributions can finance up to 75 per cent of eligible African Union-led peace support operations, subject to Security Council approval and other conditions.

That was not merely rhetorical recognition. It created an operational route to more predictable funding, although its practical value will depend on whether the Council authorises missions under the framework and whether the remaining financing gaps are filled

What a non-binding resolution can and cannot do

It would be a mistake to treat every successful UN vote as if it immediately changed international law. Most General Assembly resolutions are recommendations. Ghana's reparations resolution does not compel Britain, the United States or any former slave-trading power to pay compensation. Togo's map resolution cannot force schools, publishers or technology companies to abandon the Mercator projection.

But it would be equally mistaken to dismiss such resolutions as empty gestures. International norms often develop in stages. A resolution can establish an agreed vocabulary, document the scale of an injustice, legitimise demands that were previously kept at the margins and give governments and campaigners a platform for the next negotiation. It can also impose a reputational cost on states that stand against an overwhelming majority.

The effect therefore depends on what follows. A declaration may remain symbolic. A repeated series of resolutions can launch a negotiating process. A negotiated convention can eventually create legal obligations for the countries that ratify it. A Security Council resolution, unlike an ordinary General Assembly recommendation, may also carry binding authority under the UN Charter, although the exact force depends on its wording and legal basis.

The recent African victories sit at different points on this spectrum. The map resolution primarily seeks institutional and cultural change. The reparations resolution creates political recognition and a foundation for further action. The tax initiative is progressing toward a treaty. The peace-operations resolution has already created a funding framework. Lumping all four together as merely symbolic would hide these important differences.

Why African diplomacy is succeeding

Numbers are the starting point. Africa has 54 UN member states, more than a quarter of the General Assembly. When those countries agree on a position and vote together, they form a substantial bloc. They can then work through the Group of 77 and China, the Caribbean Community and other coalitions across Asia, Latin America and the Pacific to build a majority.

But numbers alone are not enough. African countries have had the same numerical presence for years. The recent difference is the growing discipline with which particular states lead agreed campaigns. Nigeria carried the tax initiative. Ghana led the slavery resolution. Togo fronted the cartographic campaign. Ghana, Gabon and Mozambique worked together on peace-operation financing.

The proposals have also been framed in language capable of travelling beyond the continent. Tax cooperation is presented as a question of equal participation and revenue fairness. Accurate maps concern education and truthful representation. Reparatory justice is connected to historical truth, cultural restitution and present inequality. Peace-operation financing appeals to the UN's responsibility for international peace and security.

Finally, the old diplomatic balance is changing. Western governments remain influential, but they do not command an automatic General Assembly majority. On subjects where African states maintain unity and build alliances across the Global South, opposition from Washington or European capitals may no longer be enough to stop a proposal.

There is a necessary caution. Four prominent campaigns do not, by themselves, prove that Africa is winning more often across the entire UN system. Nor is the continent uniformly united. African governments still divide over conflicts, democratic standards, trade interests and relations with major powers. The narrower conclusion is nevertheless important: where a common African position is specific, sustained and backed by technical preparation, the bloc has shown an increasing ability to move an issue from the margins to the centre of multilateral debate.

What must happen after the vote

Africa should celebrate these votes, but celebration must not become the end of the strategy. Each resolution needs an implementation plan, an institution responsible for following it, measurable objectives and regular public reporting.

For Ghana's reparations campaign, the next steps could include a clearly defined African and Caribbean framework, documented categories of harm, specific proposals for restitution and development, and a negotiating strategy that distinguishes moral acknowledgement from enforceable legal claims. Ghana must also show how this international campaign connects to education, museums, archives and historical preservation at home.

For the map campaign, African governments can act without waiting for former colonial powers. They can revise school materials, public maps and official communications, then press publishers and digital platforms to follow. Implementation can begin in Accra, Lomé and Addis Ababa even if Washington remains unconvinced.

On taxation, African states will need technical expertise and political unity throughout negotiations. Winning the right to negotiate a convention is not the same as winning strong provisions in its final text. Wealthier countries and multinational interests will seek language favourable to their own tax systems. The African Group must remain as organised during the detailed drafting as it was during the headline votes.

Resolution 2719 has already exposed the distance between agreement and execution. By late 2025, nearly two years after its unanimous adoption, the Security Council had still not authorised an AU-led operation to receive funding through the framework. An attempt to apply it to the African Union mission in Somalia failed to secure consensus, with the United States objecting that the conditions had not been met. The Council renewed the mission through 2026, but not through the financing mechanism Africa had fought to establish. A framework that powerful states can decline to activate is a victory, but an incomplete one.

The larger lesson is encouraging. Africa is not powerless at the United Nations. When its governments agree on a specific demand, appoint credible leadership, prepare the technical argument and build a wider coalition, they can alter the international agenda. The recent votes have demonstrated diplomatic capacity that is too often underestimated, including by Africans themselves.

This is the distinction African diplomacy must now master. Agenda-setting power can force the world to discuss an issue. Bargaining power shapes the final rules. Implementation power delivers money, institutional change and accountability. Africa has recently demonstrated the first. Its future influence will depend on building the second and third.

The votes have been won. The real test is whether Africa can make the decisions reached in New York matter in Accra, Lomé, Mogadishu and across the continent.